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the rothermel Fire-Spread Model:
Still running Like a champ
 iSSue 2                            MArcH 2008
In 1972, aeronautical engineer Richard C. Rothermel,
of the USDA Fire Sciences Lab at Missoula, Montana, developed a method for modeling the
spread of wildfire. The model became widely used, and although the ensuing years
have brought many technological innovations, it is still the engine of the predictive tools
used by fire behavior officers today. The JFSP is pleased to offer Dick Rothermel’s story
as a tribute to a significant accomplishment, and also to showcase
some of the current work at the Fire Sciences Lab.
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It is August of 1979, a hot, dry summer. The 
Montana woods, spattered by lightning, are erupting 
in one forest fire after another. One is burning in 
a remote, rugged corner of the Bitterroot National 
Forest. 
You are a fire behavior analyst on the overhead 
team assigned to that fire. It is 8 o’clock in the 
evening. In 2 hours, your plans chief will want a 
complete briefing on tomorrow’s likely events.
Your tools are a sheaf of graphs depicting 
various fuel types and a Texas Instruments hand-held 
calculator with a special chip. 
You gather the data: wind speed, slope and aspect 
of the hillsides, types and moisture content of fuel 
on the ground. You determine which type of fuel this 
fire is burning in—this requires some judgment and 
practice. You check the weather forecast.
You feed the information into the calculator. A set 
of preprogrammed equations crunches the numbers 
and tells you how fast the fire is likely to spread, how 
intensely it is likely to burn, and where it is likely to 
go. You have the critical information in time for the 
briefing, and your plans chief is pleased.
Now it is August of 2004, another hot, dry season. 
You have just arrived on a fire in the same rugged 
area, and your plans chief wants a complete briefing. 
She hands you her laptop computer, which is linked 
through a wireless modem to a data library at the 
Forest Service’s Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory.
You log on and open a sophisticated spatial fire-
modeling tool called FARSITE. As you feed in the 
numbers, you watch the simulated fire blossom in 
red pixels across the screen. You have the critical 
information in time for the briefing, and your plans 
chief is pleased.
The difference between a hardwired calculator 
and a multi-layered digital map may 
seem like the difference between a 
Model T and a Mustang, but these 
two hypothetical projections are 
powered by the same engine—a set 
of mathematical equations developed 
by Richard C. Rothermel 35 years 
ago at the Fire Sciences Laboratory in 
Missoula, Montana. 
Rothermel’s model was 
the Forest Service’s first 
quantitative, systematic tool 
for predicting the spread and 
intensity of forest fires, and 
it is still the main tool being 
used today. Rothermel, 
now 78, has been retired 
for 13 years. He is tall, 
courteous, reserved, and 
soft-spoken. He seems a 
bit surprised that his fire-
spread model is still going 
strong. “It’s had a long life,” 
he says, with characteristic 
understatement. 
A model, as the name implies, is a simplified 
representation of some thing or process that exists in 
the world. A model is a caricature of reality. A B-17 
aircraft can be reduced, simplified, and represented in 
a structure of plastic and glue. A physical process such 
as fire can be reduced, simplified, and represented in a 
structure of mathematics.
Richard Rothermel’s fire-spread model reduces 
a forest fire to a set of equations operating in a 
hypothetical universe in which fires burn only small, 
uniform, dead fuels on the forest floor. The model 
does not need to know what species of trees or shrubs 
are growing on a site, except as they are represented 
as “fuel” of one type or another. The model attempts 
to describe mathematically the physical and chemical 
processes of fire.
Rothermel and his team completed development 
of the model in a hurry, in response to their superiors’ 
demands for a way to reliably predict fire danger 
over broad landscapes. What it lacks in complexity, 
it makes up in reliability and ease of use. Even today, 
despite widely acknowledged limitations—which 
Rothermel is the first to point out—the Rothermel 
model of fire spread and intensity is still the most 
widely used, and it is a component of many fire 
management tools now in use.
“It was a big deal to have a 
quantitative way to calculate fire 
danger and fire behavior,” says Patricia 
Andrews, a research physical scientist 
and computer programmer whom 
Rothermel hired in 1973 as a computer 
programmer to help him implement 
Rothermal today. (Courtesy of 
Richard C. Rothermal.)
“It was a big deal to 
have a quantitative 
way to calculate  
fire danger and  
fire behavior.” 
3Fire Science DigeSt                           iSSue 2                                             MArcH 2008
the model. “Even though there has been a lot of work 
aimed at improving it, we don’t have a better one yet.”
For most of its 103-year existence, a high priority 
of the Forest Service has been protecting the forest 
from fire. The catastrophic fires of 1910, in which 
more than 3 million acres of forest were burned and at 
least 85 people lost their lives, focused the attentions 
of Forest Service officials in the Washington, DC, 
Branch of Research, notably Assistant Forester Earle 
H. Clapp.
In 1922, Clapp assigned Harry T. Gisborne, 
a young forestry graduate from Michigan, to the 
Priest River Forest 
Experiment Station 
then headquartered in 
Missoula, Montana, and 
directed him to develop a 
fire research program. 
Gisborne went to 
work with the vigor of a 
smokejumper wielding 
a Pulaski against a fast-
moving blaze. It was a 
time when fire control 
was a “nearly ceaseless 
emergency,” according 
to Gisborne’s biographer 
Charles E. (Mike) Hardy. 
Gisborne was impatient and irascible, driving others 
and himself hard in his quest for practical results, 
operating at a pitch of stress that would eventually kill 
him. 
Gisborne systematically, and often singlehandedly, 
collected information about fire and its endlessly 
varied environment: fuels, winds, slopes, moisture, 
climate, weather. His 27-year effort produced 
quantities of basic data on fire that proved a gold mine 
for later researchers. 
Gisborne also began devising a 
system for predicting the likelihood 
and potential severity of forest 
fires in a given place in a given 
season. In 1931, he developed what 
he called a “fire danger meter,” a 
method for integrating information 
about fuel moisture, wind speed, 
relative humidity, and condition 
of the landscape into an easily 
understood rating of fire danger. 
Reconstructing the 
Tragic Race
When Dick Rothermel 
appeared on national 
television as a Forest 
Service spokesman during 
the 1988 Yellowstone fires, 
it wasn’t his first brush with 
fame. Early in the 1980s, 
a retired University of 
Chicago English professor 
named Norman Maclean 
got in touch with him at the 
Missoula Fire Sciences 
Lab. Maclean, author of 
the well-known memoir A River Runs Through It, was 
writing a book about the Mann Gulch fire. Maclean 
was raised in Montana and had fought forest fires 
in his younger days. He wanted to know everything 
about how the young Mann Gulch firefighters died. In 
particular, he wanted to know exactly when and where 
the fire had caught up with them as they fled up the 
south flank of the gulch on August 4, 1949.
Rothermel agreed to work with Maclean. With 
information from the Mann Gulch investigation about 
the timing of certain events, he used his fire model to 
estimate how fast the fire was going and how much 
time had elapsed between when the men turned around 
and headed back upgulch and when the fire overtook 
them. He published his findings in a 1993 paper called 
“Mann Gulch: A Race That Couldn’t Be Won.”
Maclean was nearing his 80s when he began work 
on his book. Young Men and Fire was published in 
1992, 2 years after Maclean’s death. In it, he draws on 
Rothermel’s calculations to reconstruct the story of the 
young men’s race for their lives. He gives generous 
praise and thanks to the Northern Research Station, 
the Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, and Richard 
Rothermel and his colleagues. 
The hard-driving Harry Gisborne 
in a relaxed moment.
Gisborne’s rating system was adopted by the Forest 
Service and went through several refinements during 
his time and afterward.
In 1949, the last year of 
Gisborne’s life, a forest fire in the 
Gates of the Mountains area in 
the Missouri River canyon near 
Helena, Montana, took the lives 
of 12 smokejumpers and another 
firefighter. The Mann Gulch fire 
was assumed at first to be a routine 
containment job, but it unexpectedly 





of basic data on
fire that proved
a gold mine for
later researchers.
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The Mann Gulch incident quickly 
became a nationwide story. Some 
people blamed the Forest Service for 
the young men’s deaths. There was an 
investigation. Harry Gisborne, who 
had not been present at the fire, was 
directed to develop a theory of why it 
had behaved as it had. He’d gathered 
copious data on fires, but he realized 
that there was still no scientific basis 
on which to build a theory. The Mann 
Gulch tragedy had made it clear that 
the Forest Service needed a way not only to predict 
fire danger generally, but to predict, and also to assess 
after the fact, the behavior of a fire on a particular site. 
A couple of months after the fire, Gisborne, intent on 
his investigation, insisted on walking the rugged gulch, 
and he collapsed and died of a heart attack. He was 56 
years old.
The incidence and severity of forest fires waned 
in the 1950s, and the Forest Service pursued other 
priorities. Then in the late 1950s, Gisborne’s colleague 
and friend Jack Barrows, determined to continue his 
mentor’s work, pushed the Forest Service to establish 
laboratories devoted to the study of forest fires. 
Barrows was the main architect of the lab at Missoula 
(others were established at Riverside, California, and 
Macon, Georgia), and he became the first director of 
the Missoula lab when it opened in 1960. 
Barrows went looking for researchers. He learned 
that General Electric was closing a laboratory in Idaho 
Falls where engineers had been working on a defense 
project to develop a nuclear-powered airplane. The 
government scrapped the program in 1961, and a 
handful of highly trained engineers and 
scientists were suddenly up for grabs. 
“GE wanted to see that we got 
as good a placement as we could,” 
Rothermel recalls. “So we all wrote 
resumes, and Jack got hold of these, 
and he said it was like a Sears and 
Roebuck catalog of people.” Barrows 
hired four of the GE scientists: Hal 
Anderson, a physicist; Stan Hirsh, 
an electrical engineer; Eric Breuer, a 
technician; and Dick Rothermel.
Their hiring represented a departure from Forest 
Service custom. Up until that time, fire research had 
been pretty much the domain of foresters, who are 
used to looking at their work through the lenses of 
biology and silviculture. Gisborne was a forester; 
Barrows was a forester. But Barrows recognized that 
fire is a physical process, and that physical scientists 
and engineers could contribute much to the emerging 
science of fire behavior.
Rothermel, then barely into his 30s, was glad 
to join Barrows’s staff. He had a bachelor’s degree 
in aeronautical engineering from the University of 
Washington. During the 8 years since he’d graduated, 
he had worked in the engineering of nuclear systems in 
Albuquerque and then in Idaho. (Rothermel later went 
on for a master’s degree in mechanical engineering 
from Colorado State University.)
“I had the option of staying on [at GE] and 
working on a lot of programs, but with the cancellation 
of the atomic-powered airplane, nothing sounded 
that appealing,” he says. “And then I heard about this 
laboratory, and they said they had two wind tunnels 
Combustion chamber at Missoula Fire Lab; photo taken in the mid-
1960s.
Jack Barrows examines a fire in the combustion chamber at the 
Missoula Fire Sciences Lab. Barrows was the main architect of the 
Missoula laboratory.
The Mann Gulch 
fire was assumed at 
first to be a routine 
containment job,
but it unexpectedly 
“blew up” and 
overtook the fleeing 
firefighters.
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and a combustion lab where you could control the 
atmosphere, temperature, and humidity. I thought, 
“Wow, that’s an opportunity!”
Rothermel worked with Hal Anderson to get the 
new lab’s equipment calibrated and running smoothly. 
Then they began a set of experiments in the wind 
tunnel and combustion chamber, testing the effects of 
wind and moisture on various fuels and determining 
how fast a fire would spread under different 
conditions. 
In the meantime, Jack Barrows was transferred to 
Washington, DC, to become head of Forest Service fire 
research. Barrows was keen to complete Gisborne’s 
work on a fire danger rating system. He wanted to 
develop a system that would cover the whole country, 
and he wanted to do it fast—within 2 years. A team 
was assembled from all three fire laboratories. The 
Missoula Lab’s part was to find ways to characterize 
fire behavior.
Given their training, it made sense to Rothermel 
and Anderson to approach the task as an engineering 
problem. Says Rothermel: “The idea was, if we could 
develop a way of describing the fuels, the weather, the 
topography, and something about the fire, and be able 
to put that into what we call a mathematical model, 
and if we described all these things properly, the model 
would integrate it and produce answers. It would tell 
you the resulting fire intensity, rate of spread, flame 
length, these sorts of things.”
Rothermel, Anderson, and Bill Frandsen, 
another physicist on the project, adapted an approach 
developed by an early Forest Service fire researcher, 
Wally Fons, which turned on the concept of 
conservation of energy. A fire spreads by igniting a 
series of little fires in the fuel ahead of it. The ignitions 
are driven by convection, radiation, and conduction. 
Even if it’s unknown which mode is operating in 
a given instance, the rate of heat transfer can be 
measured. The researchers reasoned that if they knew 
how much fuel was ahead of a fire, how big and how 
densely packed the fuel particles were, and how much 
moisture the fuel contained, then they could figure out 
how much energy would be needed to transfer enough 
heat to bring the fuel up to the ignition point. They 
could then calculate the rate of ignition that would 
carry the fire as it spread. The model would also have 
to account for the critical variables of wind speed and 
slope of the ground. 
Because of the limitations of wind tunnels and 
combustion chambers, the model is forced to make 
certain assumptions that don’t hold in real life. For 
example, it assumes that the fuel is continuous and 
evenly distributed and burns uniformly. It further 
assumes that the fire is carried primarily by dead plant 
material and that only moisture will stop it. 
The Rothermel model “describes very well a 
fire burning in a field of wheat,” says Bret Butler, a 
mechanical engineer at the Fire Sciences Lab whom 
Rothermel and colleague work with the Lab’s fuelbed.
Dick Rothermel (left) and colleague Merlin Brown adjust controls on 
the wind tunnel at the Fire Sciences Lab, 1963.
A young Dick Rothermel watches a fire in the wind tunnel at the  
Missoula Fire Sciences Lab in the early 1960s.
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Rothermel hired in 1992. “As you get further away 
from that uniformity, the less accurate it becomes.” 
More significantly, the researchers had no basis for 
modeling the endless spatial variability that actually 
exists in a forest. So there was no way to simulate 
a fire’s movement through clumpy, 
discontinuous trees and shrubs. There 
was also no way to model a crown 
fire, one that leaves the surface and 
moves up into the crowns of trees. 
These were significant and universally 
acknowledged shortcomings.
Fire research scientists throughout 
the world are working on developing 
more accurate surface-fire spread 
models, but at this point all of them 
are too complicated to be used in an 
operational system. The beauty of 
Rothermel’s model, says Butler, “is that it’s simple—it 
can be run quickly with a low-capability computer.”  
It took a little longer than 2 years, but the team 
accomplished its mission. Rothermel published their 
findings in 1972 in a paper on the fire spread model. 
Rothermal’s model became the basis for the first 
national-level fire danger rating system, developed 
by researchers in Fort Collins, Colorado. The Forest 
Service and other land management agencies had an 
updated tool for predicting which seasons might be 
particularly bad and where fires would have the worst 
impacts.
Rothermel believed the model could be made even 
more useful. He had visited many active forest fires 
in the course of his work, and he saw overhead teams 
struggling to predict what the fire was going to do, 
with basically nothing to go on. “They were supposed 
to calculate the probabilities” of certain patterns of 
spread or intensity, he says, but “I never saw anybody 
who had any [basis] for calculating these probabilities. 
There was really room for developing something for 
these people to use.”
Traditionally, the best predictors of what a 
forest fire would do were the eyeballs and judgment 
of the crew chief. A forest fire throws out a lot of 
information, much of it obscured by smoke and 
noise. As Norman MacLean writes in Young Men 
and Fire, his book about the Mann Gulch fire: “It 
is hard to know what to do with all the detail that 
rises out of a fire. It rises out of a fire as thick as 
smoke and threatens to blot out everything.” How 
well this information got absorbed, synthesized, and 
communicated depended on the experience and level-
headedness of the crew’s leader.
Rothermel and his team thought their model 
might be able to augment human observation and 
judgment by distilling sensible data 
out of the smoke and confusion of 
an actual forest fire. But first they 
had to overcome a big obstacle: they 
needed a shorthand way to describe 
the large potential array of fuel types, 
so that a fire behavior analyst could 
identify quickly what he or she was 
facing. With that, it might be possible 
to get the model to produce not just 
probabilities but actual numbers—feet 
per minute of spread, length of the 
flames in feet, fireline intensity in 
BTUs per second per foot. 
Rothermel’s 1972 paper included a list of 11 fuel 
models representing typical field situations. Fuel 
models are representations of typical fuel profiles and 
contain a complete set of inputs for the mathematical 
fire spread model. The team’s research engineer, Frank 
Albini, expanded the number of fuel models to 13 
and developed a series of nomograms, or graphs, to 
give the spread rate, intensity, and flame length under 
any combination of slope steepness, wind speed, and 
moisture content. There are two nomograms for each 
fuel model, one for low wind speeds and one for high 
wind speeds. 
Albini, who died in 2005, was “the closest I’ve 
ever seen to a mathematical genius,” Rothermel says. 
Albini’s nomograms are mathematically terse. All the 
data for each fuel type fit onto two notebook pages. 
A fire behavior analyst can quickly study the graphs, 
identify the parameters that fit the situation at hand, 
Dick Rothermel uses a TI-59 calculator programmed with his fire 
spread model on a fire site circa 1983.
“The beauty of 
Rothermel’s
model … is that
it’s simple—
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and draw a series of lines to arrive at a likely rate of 
spread and intensity. The calculation can be done with 
pencil and paper and a little know-how.
Another step was taken in 1979 when research 
forester Bob Burgan turned the spread model into a 
computer program and had it burned 
onto a special chip for the Texas 
Instruments Model 59 hand-held 
calculator. Now fire behavior analysts 
had a quick and reliable way to assess 
their situations and make decisions 
on where to deploy crews, whether to 
order in airplanes or bulldozers, when 
to hold the fire line, and when to get 
out of the way.
Getting his model out into the world was a top 
priority for Rothermel. “Somehow [technology 
transfer] was inherent in my makeup,” he told Forest 
Service historian Harold Steen in a 2005 interview. “I 
felt if I wasn’t doing something worthwhile, then why 
are you doing it? So I guess it’s the engineer coming 
out.” 
“He worked hard to get it implemented,” says 
Pat Andrews, “and that’s to his credit. Some other 
researchers might have published their findings and 
moved on, but he worked hard to get it into use.”
In 1976, Rothermel began teaching a course at the 
Fire Training Center in Marana, Arizona. He was part 
of a group that trained fire analysts from the Forest 
Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, and other land management agencies 
in how to apply his model through use of Albini’s 
nomograms.
“That was a wonderful opportunity to get our stuff 
into application,” he says. “The fun part was going out 
on a fire and being with the people we’d trained. We’d 
probably have 35 or 40 in our classes. Then we’d go 
to a fire and meet these folks: ‘Oh, hi! How are you 
doing?’ They’d welcome me in and show me what 
they were doing. I’d get some feedback as to what was 
working well and where they were having trouble.”
Sometimes he would learn that the model’s 
predictions of a given fire’s behavior were nothing like 
what actually happened. “So every year at Marana, 
we’d learn what we did poorly the year before and 
beef it up that winter,” he says. “I remember one of 
the things that we didn’t have was a good way of 
estimating fuel moisture. We didn’t have good ways 
of estimating wind speed at the mid-flame level, and 
Frank worked on that a lot. We didn’t have quick ways 
of assessing wind speed on a slope, and we worked 
that out too.”
“Those were exciting times,” recalls Jan van 
Wagtendonk, a research forester with the U.S. 
Geological Survey at Yosemite 
National Park, who taught with 
Rothermel at Marana. “In the evening 
he would scribble a new equation on a 
napkin and the next morning we would 
include it in our lessons.” 
In 1983, Rothermel assembled the 
training materials into a publication 
called How to Predict the Spread and 
Intensity of Forest and Range Fires. 
It came to be known as “the Bible,” 
according to Bob Mutch, a research 
forester who taught the Marana courses 
with Rothermel. Rothermel himself was “Mr. Fire 
Behavior.” Says Mutch: “He was user-friendly, and he 
was practical. He’d say, ‘Use the model to the best of 
your ability, and then use what your eyes are telling 
you. One without the other is incomplete.’”
In July of 1988, as the forest fires in Yellowstone 
Park were making national headlines, Rothermel, 
Burgan, and some others traveled there, assigned 
to develop a worst-case scenario. During that time, 
“Those were exciting 
times … In the evening 
he [Rothermel] 
would scribble a new 
equation on a napkin 
and the next morning 
we would include it in 
our lessons.” 
Nomogram created by Frank Albini.
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Tools for Fire Managers 1
Improving the usefulness of decision support systems 
for modeling and analyzing wildland fire is an ongoing 
mission of fire scientists at the Missoula Fire Sciences 
Laboratory and elsewhere. Some of the decision 
support systems available to fire managers include:
BehavePlus
A fire modeling system that is an expanded version of 
the BEHAVE fire behavior prediction and fuel modeling 
system, which was developed by Pat Andrews and 
others at the Missoula Fire Sciences Lab in 1986. 
BehavePlus combines many models, including 
Rothermel’s, that describe fire behavior, fire effects, and 
the fire environment.
FArSite
FARSITE incorporates several models of fire behavior 
in space and time to simulate a fire burning across 
a variable landscape under changing environmental 
conditions. FARSITE can help analysts determine the 
rate and direction of spread of a particular fire and 
predict when it will reach a given location.
FlamMap
A spatial fire-behvior analysis and mapping program. 
It is different from FARSITE in that it produces 
independent calculations of different dynamics of fire, 
such as intensity at the fire line and length of flames. 
It lends itself well to comparisons of two different 
landscapes in terms of their potential fire behavior, and 
it helps fire analysts identify hazardous combinations of 
fuels and topography before a fire occurs.
FireFamily Plus
A fire climatology program that allows the user to 
compute fire danger in a given area and to summarize 
and analyze historical weather observations in 
association with local data on fire occurrence.
rare event risk Assessment Process (rerAP)
Estimates the risk that a fire will reach a particular 
place before it dies. RERAP incorporates Rothermel’s 
surface-fire spread model along with models for 
weather, fuels, and topography.
WindWizard
An interface to a computational fluid dynamics model 
called FLUENT, which simulates the effect of terrain on 
wind. WindWizard produces wind velocity and direction 
to a resolution of 100 meters. Output can be imported 
into FARSITE and FlamMap to improve fire behavior 
simulations.
FireStem
A computer model designed to aid in predicting 
tree mortality based on fire behavior and intensity. 
Eventually, FireStem will be included in BehavePlus to 
produce improved mortality predictions based on fuel 
information, moisture, and fire behavior for a specific 
region and range of tree species.
Wildland Fire Assessment System
An integrated, Web-based resource that provides multi-
temporal and multi-spatial views of fire weather and 
fire potential, including fuel moistures and fire danger 
classes from the National Fire Danger Rating System, 
as well as indices of drought, atmospheric stability, and 
vegetation conditions. WFAS provides short-term fire-
potential forecasts, from 24 hours to 30 days.
Behave-Plus plot of rate of spread.Behave-Plus diagram of fire containment.
1  From Stratton, Richard D. 2006. Guidance on Spatial Wildland Fire Analysis: Models, Tools, and Techniques. General Technical Report 
RMRS-GTR-183, USDA Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station, Fort Collins, CO.; also Andrews, Patricia and Queen, Lloyd. 2001. 
Fire modeling and information system technology. International Journal of Wildland Fire 10:343-352; also Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, 
Fire Models.org, http://www.firemodels.org/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/, accessed September 10, 2007.
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Rothermel was also drafted as a media spokesman for 
the Forest Service, appearing on national television 
to explain what was happening in America’s favorite 
national park. 
About his primary assignment, he says, “The 
problem was we couldn’t come up with a worst-case 
scenario because … the winds came 
again and again and again, and the worst 
case happened almost weekly.” He and 
his colleagues had assumed that, as in 
normal years, rain would come in August 
to dampen the fires. That didn’t happen. 
“It was an amazing season. Nobody had 
seen this combination of weather and fires 
before.”
He came away from Yellowstone 
determined to create a model for crown 
fires before he retired. It still was not 
possible to model crown fire behavior in the wind 
tunnel, so he gathered observations of severe real-life 
fires and categorized them into three basic types. In 
1991, he wrote a simple guide on how to predict the 
spread and intensity of each of these types. “Once 
again, he stepped up to the plate,” says Bret Butler. 
“He saw a need and filled it.”
In the years since Rothermel retired, the Missoula 
Fire Sciences Lab and others have incorporated 
his model into many predictive tools used by fire 
managers today. These are known as “decision support 
systems” because they are intended to support the 
experienced judgment of a fire behavior analyst and 
other fire managers. Fire modeling systems such as 
BehavePlus, a 2001 update of the original BEHAVE 
developed by Pat Andrews and her colleagues, and the 
FARSITE fire area simulator, developed by research 
forester Mark Finney in 1998, link Rothermel’s 
fire spread model with other models to 
create increasingly powerful and subtle 
representations of reality. 
FARSITE, for example, is a spatially 
explicit (i.e., map-creating) computer tool 
that incorporates Rothermel’s models 
for surface and crown fires with several 
others, including crown-fire models by 
Canadian researcher C.E. Van Wagner. 
It also includes models by Albini that 
describe spotting (ignitions from bits of 
burning material thrown ahead of a fire), 
acceleration of a fire from its starting point, and fuel 
moisture. FARSITE also packs in digital maps of fuels 
and topography and a 3-day weather forecast. Fed the 
appropriate information, FARSITE will “grow” a fire 
in living color on a computer screen even as the actual 
fire is burning. 
Through the years, such tools have been 
periodically refined as researchers developed more 
accurate ways to characterize the inputs—fuel 
moisture, wind speed, and so forth. This refinement 
will continue, says Mark Finney, but these days 
the lab’s basic research program is departing from 
Rothermel’s footsteps to pursue other conceptual 
paths. 
“Dick and his team set the stage for the things 
we’re doing today,” says Finney. “Did he envision 
the huge consequences of his work? It may have gone 
well beyond his imagining. It set off a whole field of 
A FARSITE simulation of the 1996 Bee Fire in the San Bernardino 
National Forest. (From the USDA Forest Service Strategic Planning 








Rothermel (right) and colleague Rod Norum on the Big Salt River 
fire, Alaska, 1977.
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fire prediction science, and it produced 
spinoffs that he could not have thought 
of.”
The limitations of the Rothermel 
model, he believes, are inherent in its 
empirical, statistical approach—the 
best possible approach at the time, but 
adequate no longer. “Now we have 
a lot of new problems that weren’t 
recognized back in the 1970s,” says 
Finney. “New demands are being 
placed on those old models. We’re 
asking them to do things they were not 
designed to do, to answer questions 
that didn’t have a practical context 
then.”
One of these questions is, when is fire a blessing 
rather than a curse? At the time Rothermel was 
developing his model, land management agencies were 
barely beginning to reconsider the policy that the only 
good fire is a dead fire, and many still clung fiercely 
to that conviction. In the early 1970s, 
Bob Mutch was working on a program 
called Whitecap, investigating what 
was then called “prescribed natural 
fire planning” for wilderness areas. 
(Today it is called “wildland fire use.”) 
The program drew bitter criticism 
from some long-time agency foresters. 
“They thought, ‘Here are these wild-
eyed people, suggesting that fires 
might actually be doing some good,’” 
says Mutch with a chuckle. Dick 
Rothermel was developing his model 
at a time when suppression was pretty 
much the only objective.
Mark Finney and his colleagues 
represent the next generation of fire researchers. 
They are questioning old assumptions and trying 
to describe fire in a new way. Specifically, they are 
looking more deeply into the three modes of heat 
transfer—conduction, convection, and radiation—in 
an attempt to understand the actual mechanisms of fire 
spread. The Rothermel equation, based on empirical 
measurements, does not specify how a fire spreads, 
and therefore it can’t address questions like, how does 
convection differ from radiation in how fast it transfers 
heat energy into a living pine tree? More insight into 
the basic mechanisms of fire, Finney believes, will 
lead to better methods for accurately modeling fire in 
the clumpy, discontinuous real world. 
Along with everyone else, Finney acknowledges 
that any new way to model a complicated physical 
process like fire will need to strike something like the 
balance that Rothermel’s model achieves: it will need 
to be detailed enough to be accurate most of the time, 
yet simple enough to be useful to people who must 
quickly parse the smoky, noisy chaos of forest fire 
and come out with accurate and potentially life-saving 
information.
In 1981, Rothermel received one of the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s highest honors, the 
Superior Service Award, for “outstanding creativity 
in developing fire behavior prediction technology 
and training programs, enhancing the implementation 
of the Forest Service’s revised fire policy.” Says his 
colleague Jan Van Wagtendonk, “Dick represents the 
best that science has to offer. He has a brilliant mind 
and is able to transfer his knowledge and wisdom to 
field personnel with humor and humility.” 
Rothermel still lives in Missoula and visits the 
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Illustration from page 5 of Rothermel’s A mathematical model for 
predicting fire spread in wildland fuels. Research Paper INT-115, 
January 1972.
Figure 2.--Schematic of
   no-wind fire.
Figure 3.--Schematic of
   wind-driven fire.
Figure 4.--Schematic of
   upslope fire.
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